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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Philosophers of music and psychologists have examined the various ways in which music is capable of 
arousing emotions in a listener. Among philosophers, opinions diverge as to the different types of music-
induced emotions and as to their relevance to music listening. A somewhat neglected question concerns 
the possibility of developing a general criterion for the artistic relevance of music-induced emotions. In 
this paper, I will try to formulate such a criterion. In whatever way music may induce emotions and 
regardless of the sorts of emotion music is taken to arouse, a given emotion will qualify as artistically 
relevant if and only if it is caused by appropriate listening, it is dependent on features of the piece of 
music as a work of art and is capable of further directing our attention to such features.   
 
 
II. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The broadest approach to the issue of music-induced emotions is to consider music as a stimulus much as 
any other and to describe the different mechanisms by means of which music is able to arouse emotion. 
This is of clear interest in psychological research.1 The philosopher of art, however, is interested in the 
emotions aroused by music especially if they bear some sort of relation to the piece of music as the work 
of art it is. For instance, the idiosyncratic association of a piece with a sad memory might result in sadness 
being aroused whenever the piece is played, but this fact is not artistically relevant. However intuitive this 
might seem, philosophers of art have not elaborated, as far as I am aware, a general criterion for the 
artistic relevance of music-induced emotions. It will be my aim in this paper to develop such a criterion. 
Arousal theorists contend that musical expressiveness is of a piece with the music’s capacity to 
arouse emotions in a listener.2 On this account, the artistic relevance of music-induced emotions is at least 
partially explained by their connection with musical expressiveness. In this paper, however, I am 
assuming that expressiveness is independent of emotional arousal – although it might as a matter of fact 
often produce such an arousal. This is a reasonable assumption because a general criterion of artistic 
relevance for music-induced emotions would also be applicable to the emotional arousal that arousal 
theorists consider essentially linked to musical expressiveness. I should also stress that I intend my 
criterion to apply only to pure music, as the issue of artistic relevance is both simpler (in that it involves 
fewer components) and more problematic (in that it is most puzzling) in the case of instrumental music. 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (1): GENERAL INTEREST IN AESTHETIC RELEVANCE 
While there has been, to my knowledge, no attempt to formulate a general criterion of artistic relevance 
for music-induced emotions, the same cannot be said in the case of aesthetic relevance, broadly 
construed. Such a general criterion for aesthetic relevance (extended to all arts, and potentially to non-
artistic contexts) has been formulated by Marcia Eaton: she holds that “A statement (or gesture) is 
aesthetically relevant if and only if it draws attention (perception, reflection) to an aesthetic property.”3 
Allen Carlson claims that the question concerning aesthetic relevance is that of “what, if anything, 
of that which an object does not present to the senses is relevant to its appropriate appreciation.”4 He 
develops a model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature that is focused on information about the objects 
of appreciation, and especially on knowledge provided by natural science. Both Eaton and Carlson focus 
then on information that is external to the object of appreciation. (Eaton mentions both statements and 
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gestures, while Carlson focuses more on justified true beliefs.) Neither of them mentions emotions. It 
seems safe to assume that emotions, as states undergone by the appreciator, could be brought about by the 
object in question and, in turn, have an influence on our appreciation. This, as we shall see in the 
following section, is the bottom-line of Jenefer Robinson’s take on at least some music-induced emotions.  
Unlike Eaton and Carlson, in this paper I will speak of ‘artistic relevance’, in lieu of ‘aesthetic’, and 
I will do so for reasons that are worth clarifying. I believe that it is important to focus on musical works 
as works of art, that is, as products of a certain socio-historical context, the properties of which are tied to 
their position in art-historical development. In this paper I assume such a contextualist framework without 
further justification, as this seems widely agreed upon. The relevance of this point for my concerns will 
be evident when discussing appropriations and quotations of past music. What one can learn from 
accounts of aesthetic relevance such as Eaton’s and Carlson’s, however, is that, in order to qualify as 
aesthetically relevant to the appreciation of an object, something needs to be tied in some way to that 
object, either because it discloses something about the object’s properties, or because it is capable of 
directing our attention to such properties. Call this the objective condition for aesthetic relevance. I shall 
assume that something similar also applies to the case of artistic relevance.    
 
 
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (2): ARTISTIC RELEVANCE OF MUSIC-INDUCED EMOTIONS 
 
In the literature on music-induced emotions one does not find anything like a full-fledged criterion for the 
artistic relevance of music-induced emotions.  
Peter Kivy formulates four ‘rules of engagement’, that is, “conditions that, I think, a successful 
account of how absolute music might arouse mood in listeners must satisfy”.5 Although mainly concerned 
with moods, he specifies that the same conditions apply in the case of full-fledged emotions. His final 
condition states that “the moods that the theory is concerned with must be moods relevant to our 
appreciation and enjoyment of absolute music as music; that is, as art.”6 This leaves open what it means 
for a mood (or emotion) to be relevant to our appreciation of absolute music as art, and such is the 
question that I attempt to answer in this paper.  
Somewhat close to a criterion of artistic relevance for music-induced emotions is the psychologist Klaus 
Scherer’s distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic emotions. This distinction, however, is based on a 
Kantian notion of disinterested pleasure that is falling out of favour and that I wish to dispense with.7 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Jenefer Robinson has devoted detailed observations to the topic 
of music-induced emotions, showing how these help the listener to understand the music. Our emotional 
responses to expressive music can help us understand the music’s expressive properties. Similarly, 
emotional responses to the music’s development draw attention to the music’s structure.8 Despite this, 
Robinson does not attempt to develop a general criterion such as the one I am after here.9  
 
 
A CRITERION OF ARTISTIC RELEVANCE 
 
What form should a general test for the artistic relevance of music-induced emotions take, and what 
requirements should it respect? As we have seen, philosophers who have examined aesthetic relevance 
were concerned with what I called the ‘objective condition’: aesthetic appreciation is directed to specific 
objects, and whatever enhances appreciation must be related to such an object or focus our attention on 
some features of it. A similar requirement will apply in the case of artistic relevance, with the added 
complication that the object in question is appreciated as a work of art. In addition to this, a further 
condition concerns emotions as a causal event: we need to rule out cases in which an emotional response 
merely co-occurs with the music, but is not caused by the listening process. I will call this the ‘causal 
condition’. On the basis of these two general requirements I will outline the main elements of the test for 
artistic relevance and sketch a tentative formulation.  
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A preliminary requisite seems to be what I will call appropriate listening, which is constituted by 
two further conditions: competence and attention. Appropriate listening is the focused listening of a 
listener at least minimally competent with regard to the music style in question. While I contend that a 
criterion such as the one I am after need not specify what exactly counts as minimally competent 
listening, I will assume as valid the characterization of minimal musical literacy defended by Jerrold 
Levinson under the name of ‘concatenationism’.10 He holds that minimally competent music listening is 
characterized by the experience of quasi-hearing the development of the music after the moment that is 
being actually heard. Quasi-hearing is the vivid anticipation of the music’s development on the basis of a 
vivid recollection of the preceding bit of music. On this account, a listener minimally familiar with a 
musical style needs only to possess some basic discriminatory, recognitional and continuational abilities 
regarding that style. 
It will be clear that appropriate listening does not necessarily result in artistically relevant emotions. 
This way of listening could produce irrelevant emotions coming from personal associations – something 
that is indeed the case in almost any actual case of music listening. Appropriate listening is thus a 
necessary condition for artistically relevant emotions, but not a sufficient one. An additional desideratum 
for a test of artistic relevance is related to the idiosyncratic emotional responses that music critics have to 
certain works. While presumably all music critics competently focus on the musical substance of the 
piece they are listening to – rather than engaging in personal associations or flights of fancy – they 
respond emotionally in radically different ways to a given piece. Later I will offer examples of these cases 
and provide reasons to hold that these responses should be considered artistically relevant.  
As a tentative formulation of the criterion I suggest the following: 
 
A music-induced emotion is artistically relevant iff (1) it is caused by the 
listener’s appropriate listening and (2) (a) it is dependent on specific features of 
the piece of music (or of the performance thereof) as a work of art and (b) it has 
the disposition to further direct our attention to such features.   
 
A few clarifications are in order. (1) specifies the necessity of a causal connection between music 
listening and the aroused emotion. It meets, therefore, the causal condition. If the emotion merely co-
occurs it is not artistically relevant, even if it happens to be an emotion of the sort that would be typically 
induced by appropriate listening of the piece under consideration. 
(2) deals with the objective condition. In (2a), the expression ‘as a work of art’ is intended to isolate 
properties of the music that are constitutive of the piece or performance thereof. What counts as 
constitutive is arguably determined by a set of conventions regarding the art form in question. This 
condition also entails that the piece needs to be considered in its historical situatedness as belonging to a 
specific tradition – how this is relevant will be shown later, when dealing with quotations and 
appropriations of musical pieces and themes. 
(2b) intends to characterize the capacity that artistically relevant music-induced emotions have to 
direct our attention to the music. Music-induced emotions of the non-relevant kind are often ‘centrifugal’: 
they direct our attention to things other than the music itself. Artistically relevant music-induced 
emotions, on the other hand, depend on features of the music as specified by (2a). Because of this, they 
generally have the capacity to direct our attention to the musical features responsible for them.   
 
 
THREE TYPES OF MUSIC-INDUCED EMOTIONS 
 
I will now consider three different sorts of music-induced emotions and see how they fare with respect to 
the test for artistic relevance I have developed. The discussion of these emotions is particularly 
interesting, as they represent prominent ways in which music arouses listeners emotionally, and because 
we have strong intuitions as to their artistic relevance. 
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1) Kivy-emotions.11 These are emotions fitting into the standard cognitive model and taking the 
music (or performance thereof) as their intentional object. I can be lifted by the great compositional skills 
that I recognize in a piece or annoyed by a bad performance of a piece I love. Kivy believes that these 
emotions are the key to understanding how music can move us in an artistically relevant way.12 When we 
stand back in awe at the beauty of the music, we are experiencing a kind of emotion that fits the standard 
cognitive model. Its object is the music (or some of its features) and the relevant belief is one about the 
outstanding character of it.  
Are Kivy-emotions artistically relevant? It is relatively easy to produce cases in which the emotion 
induced by the music is not artistically relevant. For instance, a mother might feel pride and joy as a 
response to her child's performance, however lacking the performance might be. In this case, the emotion 
falls rather squarely into the cognitive model but there is no link to the actual features of the piece. We 
might describe this situation as one in which the attentiveness requirement is not respected, or more 
plausibly concede that the mother is listening attentively but add that her emotion has no relevant causal 
connection to her attentive listening, as it is rather induced by the fact that her child is playing in front of 
an audience.  
A more complicated case is presented in the following scenario. Suppose a violin player listens to a 
rival musician playing a challenging piece. The rival's eloquent and polished playing makes him nervous, 
envious and perhaps even slightly angry. The emotions in question are strictly linked to his appreciation 
of the rival's performance. Yet they do not seem to qualify as artistically relevant: after all they appear to 
rest on vanity more than on the actual willingness to appreciate the music played. It is worth noting, 
however, that the emotions in question are dependent on features of the piece in a way in which the 
mother's pride need not to be.  
Consider a similar example, this time involving a work of music rather than its performance. 
Imagine Rousseau listening to some of the French music he deemed inferior to the Italian. His emotional 
reactions to the piece are various and often negative. Surely they do not resemble much the average 
emotional response to the pieces in question. Yet, they are linked to the very same musical features that 
occasion the most common responses, they respond to changes in those features and are liable to further 
direct the philosopher’s attention to them. 
Both these two examples represent idiosyncratic emotional responses to music that can show 
understanding and appreciation of it. Because of this, I submit, these responses should pass a general test 
of artistic relevance, and they do pass the one suggested above. 
The two cases just mentioned are also apt to draw our attention to another interesting feature of the 
proposed criterion for artistic relevance. The work/performance duality, which is characteristic of 
performing arts such as music, might result in peculiar cases in which an emotional response is artistically 
relevant as to only one of the two. The violin player’s emotion is artistically relevant as to his rival’s 
performance, not to the piece he is playing. The relevance test I suggested is apt to distinguish Kivy-
emotions relevant to the performance from Kivy-emotions relevant to the work. As the criterion includes 
reference to the features of the music, it is evident how this might happen: the musical features of a 
performance do not completely overlap the musical features of the work. 
2) Meyer-emotions. These are named after Leonard Meyer, who famously claimed that listeners 
familiar with a musical style, even though they may lack formal training, possess an implicit mastery of 
syntactic rules governing the progress of works in that style. Listeners respond emotionally to deviation 
from the norm, as when a long-delayed cadence resolves our restless anxiety into a soothing sense of 
relief.13  
Meyer-emotions might at first seem to always qualify as artistically relevant: because they are 
related to expectations about the music’s unfolding, they always track properties of the work. However, 
things are not so simple. We could imagine a case in which the emotional response to the development of 
a piece of music is occasioned by expectations that are inappropriate to the relevant style. For instance, I 
might consider odd a plagal cadence in a Renaissance piece because I would have expected a common-
practice V-I cadence, and this might prompt an emotional response of the Meyer sort. But a IV-I (or iv-I) 
cadence is common in Renaissance music and a listener familiar with that style would not make the 
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mistake of taking it as a non-standard feature of the piece. The suggested criterion for artistic relevance 
includes a reference to appropriate listening, which is in turn characterized as attentive and minimally 
competent listening. The question is then whether this minimal familiarity with the style is sufficient to 
rule out inappropriate emotional responses of the Meyer sort. This is likely to depend on the 
characterization of minimal competence we opt for, but one should notice that, even if the bar is set at a 
relatively low level, as in the case of Levinson’s concatenationism, failure to be familiar with common 
harmonic progressions in the style would count as a failure in basic musical understanding. It follows 
from this that, under my proposed criterion, the emotions evoked by, say, an unexpected iv-I cadence 
should not be considered artistically relevant, as they are not a result of appropriate listening.  
In the case of Kivy-emotions, I have distinguished responses to the work from responses to a 
performance. This distinction is also appropriate in the case of Meyer-emotions, as there is one case in 
which these apply not to a work but to a performance: improvisation.14 Consider, as an example, an 
improvised solo in a jazz standard. In these cases, a listener has various expectations in relation to the 
musical idiom, the style of the player in question (if known), and the relation of the solo to the genre and 
particular piece that is being played. Thus, a nervous and hectic solo is likely to come as unexpected in a 
laid-back piece. Likewise, the use of an uncommon scale can surprise us. In both these cases, the ensuing 
emotional responses would all count as artistically relevant under the proposed criterion.  
3) Davies-emotions. These represent a case of emotional contagion.15 Music can 'infect' us with its 
mood, as when we become sad by listening to sad music. It is interesting to notice that our sadness in this 
case is not a full-blown emotion as described by a standard cognitive theory of emotions. It lacks in fact 
an intentional object (we are not sad about the music, but merely saddened by it) and it lacks a relevant 
belief (there is no reason why we should be sad). Stephen Davies distinguishes between attentional and 
non-attentional emotional contagion. The first one is the result of a music-focused listening.   
 
The mirroring response of the music-focused listener is of this second variety. 
She is very likely to identify the music’s expressiveness as the cause of her 
response because her reaction tracks her following of the music and recognition 
of its expressive character [...].16 
 
But this is not the only case of contagion. According to Davies, who grounds his claim on psychological 
research, emotional contagion can occur in the absence of appropriate listening (the non-attentional case). 
As an example of the non-attentional case one could take that of a listener relaxed by the laid-back pop 
music that is playing in a shopping mall. This kind of emotional contagion could not qualify as artistically 
relevant according to my criterion – it fails to meet condition (1). In the attentional case, however, the 
happiness aroused in a listener when listening to happy music is artistically relevant, as it is the result of 
appropriate listening and it is linked to a feature of the piece, namely its happy expressive character. 
A concern for my decision to exclude non-attentional contagion from the domain of artistically 
relevant emotions is the following.17 Suppose that I am at a rave party. Throbbing techno music is playing 
loudly. I have a drink and exchange a few words with someone next to me. I do not pay particular 
attention to the music, nor am I familiar with the genre. However, its steady beat and sub-bass frequencies 
get my feet tapping, and the moment after, regardless of my unwillingness to dance, my whole body is 
swinging to the music. These bodily responses (perhaps along with the drink) get me in a good mood. The 
question arises as to whether we should consider such an emotional response as artistically relevant.  
One could contend that these emotions should indeed be considered artistically (or perhaps at least 
aesthetically) relevant. I could force this case into the criterion I defended by considering the listening in 
question as focused listening, although perhaps  in a different way than the one typical of the canonical 
concert hall listening. Alternatively I could, somewhat counterintuitively, deny that the emotions in 
question are aesthetically relevant. The apparent relevance of these emotions might still be salvaged by 
allowing that they might be relevant to rave parties in a non-aesthetic way.  
My suggestion, however, differs from both of the above: I believe that music at a rave party and our 
reaction to it should not be considered in separation from the rave party as a whole: our emotional 
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reaction is relevant, and our listening is not focused, hence the contagion is non-attentional, yet our 
emotional reaction is not a reaction to the music; rather, it is a reaction to the rave party, of which the 
music is a component. The music, hardly the object of attentive listening, plays a central role in making 
possible the experience (arguably not artistic, but possibly aesthetic) that is characteristic of rave parties 
as multi-stranded experiences involving music, bodily behavior, alcohol and perhaps psychotropic 
substances.18  
 
 
THE ISSUE OF UNIFORMITY 
 
A test for artistic relevance such as the one suggested already implies that a purely subjective account of 
emotional reactions has been discarded. What is artistically relevant in a work of art might be subject-
dependent in the broad sense of requiring a subject to be appreciated, but by no means is it a projection of 
the experiencing subject. A usual preliminary way to defend the objective validity of aesthetic 
appreciation draws on the remark that there is a considerable uniformity in the aesthetic responses of 
different subjects in different times and places. It might thus be thought that, in order for us to better grant 
the artistic relevance of emotional responses to music, a uniformity condition could be added to the 
criterion. This condition would specify that artistically relevant music-induced emotions are typically 
shared by competent listeners in different historical and cultural contexts. However, the previous 
discussion has probably already shown why this might not be a good move, as Kivy-emotions are 
sometimes quite idiosyncratic and yet can possess artistic relevance.  
Another, more radical issue is that such a uniformity condition is at the same time too narrow and 
too broad. It is too narrow, because it leaves out of the criterion emotional responses that depend on the 
recognition of non-obvious properties of the sort that might be inaccessible to the average competent 
listener. If a competent listener spots, for instance, a large-scale formal compositional feature in a 
complex piece of music, her emotional reaction to that feature should be considered artistically relevant. 
It will not, however, be a shared response, as most minimally competent listeners will fail to notice the 
feature in question. This fact is especially relevant if we accept a characterization of competent listening 
as a moment by moment understanding of the music’s unfolding: in this case most induced emotions 
related to large-scale features would be out of reach for listeners who possess only a basic musical 
understanding.  
The uniformity condition is also too broad, at least if left without further qualification. Certain 
common emotional responses to a piece of music might be shared by a community of competent listeners 
in virtue of a large-scale association of the piece in question with extra-musical events or objects. Such is 
the case when classical music is used as a soundtrack: responding to Wagner’s Ride of the Valkyries by 
imagining warfare scenes from Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979) is likely to produce strong emotional 
responses, but emotional responses resting on this kind of association are hardly to be considered 
artistically legitimate responses to Wagner’s music as the work of art it is. This last consideration allows 
us to appreciate how (2a), which specifies that the response should be a response to the music as a work 
of art, takes into account the historical situatedness of the piece.  
 
 
LARGE SCALE ASSOCIATIONS EXPLOITED IN MUSICAL QUOTATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS 
 
Once established that we should not consider uniformity as a warrant of aesthetic relevance, a few more 
remarks on large-scale associations are in order. These are, like in the Valkyries’ example, extra-musical 
or inter-musical associations shared by communities of competent listeners – inter-musical associations 
being those cases in which music recalls other music. In both these two cases, large-scale association can 
be intentionally exploited by the composer in order to achieve a particular expressive effect. Such would 
be the case if someone composed a symphony using one of Ennio Morricone’s Spaghetti Western 
soundtracks, intending to exploit its association with that historical period and/or with the movies’ 
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atmosphere.19 The association does not need to be to a specific piece (inter-musical), as it could rather 
rely on the shared associations of certain musical sounds with extra-musical objects or events. In addition 
to the well-known example of wind instruments used to recall a bucolic atmosphere, we might point here 
to the established association of the Theremin with the world of the supernatural as well as with sci-fi 
atmospheres. 
While elaborating a typology of musical illustrations, Kivy draws attention to a Bach Cantata that 
provides us with another good example. In the Cantata Weinen, Klagen, Sorgen, Zagen, Bach uses the 
melody from a hymn well-known to his congregation to evoke the meaning of the text set to that tune.20 
Here we have an example of an extra-musical association achieved through an intra-musical association. 
Having pointed out the ways in which pre-existing associations could be exploited by the composer, what 
is left to do is to assess whether the resulting emotional response has to be considered artistically relevant. 
It is obvious why we should answer in the affirmative. Being intentionally exploited by the composer, the 
association and the emotional response it might evoke is apt to draw our attention to the composer’s use 
of the large-scale extra- or inter-musical association to its expressive or representational ends. Needless to 
say, awareness of the association and competence as to the discrimination of intentional use from mere 
accident are part the competent listener’s expertise, although – as shown by Bach’s example – this 
competence is strictly tied to particular historical contexts and hard to win back once lost. A person 
lacking this kind of competence nowadays might attend Wagner’s The Valkyrie and believe the composer 
is quoting the famous scene from Apocalypse Now.    
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I have tried to develop a viable criterion for the artistic relevance of music-induced 
emotions. This should allow us to better understand the relationship between the emotions induced by 
music and its appreciation. Although the criterion is here restricted to the musical domain, I speculate that 
it could apply to other art forms as well. Perhaps, with suitable qualifications, a general criterion for 
artistically relevant emotions induced by art in general could be developed.   
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belong	to	the	parts	of	the	work	that	have	been	explicitly	scored.		
15	Davies	(2011).	
16	Ibid.,	64.	
17	I	owe	this	observation,	as	well	as	some	of	the	points	made	in	response	to	it,	to	Jonathan	Neufeld.		
18	An	observation	that	is	somewhat	in	line	with	this	is	made	by	Scherer:	“While	some	kinds	of	music,	like	rock	or	
techno,	may	well	have	the	potential	to	induce	collective	affective	phenomena	in	large	groups	of	people	at	
concerts,	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	affective	manifestations,	including	motor	behaviour,	actually	induces	bona	fide	
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emotions	and	if	so,	if	these	are	due	to	the	music	or	to	the	nature	and	behavior	of	the	musicians.	To	my	knowledge,	
there	is	no	empirical	evidence	on	this	question.”	(Scherer	2004:	9)	
19	Notice	how	this	would	work	even	though	the	musical	connections	between	the	soundtrack	and	the	American	
Old	West	are	actually	loose.	In	fact,	Morricone	largely	refrained	from	using	the	instruments	traditionally	associated	
with	that	setting.	His	compositions	feature	anachronistic	instruments	such	as	the	electric	guitar	and	the	Sicilian	
marranzanu,	a	sort	of	jaw	harp.	
20	Kivy	(1984:	50).	
